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religious beliefs in their political rhetoric. This is used to justify policy, support their 
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difficult and risky rhetorical strategy for British prime ministers but it increasingly has the 
potential to yield political benefits. 
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In a lecture entitled “Faith in Politics?” in 2011, hosted by the Archbishop of Canterbury at 
Lambeth Palace, former British Labour prime minister Gordon Brown told a story about 
the interwar Conservative prime minister Stanley Baldwin “who, when redrafting his 
speeches by hand, used to regularly inscribe on the margins of the page the phrase “refer to 
AG”. And so conscientious civil servants duly sought the advice of the Attorney General 
about the legal propriety of the relevant language – until, after months of the Attorney 
General replying that he had nothing to add, the same civil servants realised this was 
Baldwin leaving a note for himself that, as he gave the speech, he should, with great 
regularity, invoke as inspiration and support for his argument A.G. . . . Almighty God” 
(Brown 2011).  
Baldwin was a devout Christian, who began each day at Number 10 Downing 
Street kneeling with his wife in prayer, and whose politics, motivation and thinking had a 
strong religious dimension. He welcomed opportunities to talk openly about his faith, and 
religious language, images, and allusions peppered many of his speeches (Williamson 1999, 
277-293).  For much of the twentieth century, however, it has been argued “most PMs and 
senior politicians were either sceptic of faith or kept their personal faith separate from their 
politics” (Cooper 2013). “British Prime Ministers of the twentieth century paid due lip 
service to their Anglican or occasionally nonconformist beliefs,” it has been said, “but few 
openly admitted allowing their religious beliefs to fuel their politics” (Spencer 2006, 21). 
Although the three immediate post-Second World War prime ministers (Clement Attlee, 
Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden) were unbelievers, the occupants of Number 10 
since the late-1950s have, with a few exceptions, been a group of politicians with personal 
Christian faith-commitments (Hennessy 2008). But however important their faith may have 
personally been, prime ministers like Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home, Edward 
Heath, Harold Wilson and John Major did not speak out openly about it while in office or 
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frontline politics. It was treated as a private matter and not something they paraded before 
the public or overtly and explicitly linked to their political programmes. Most British prime 
ministers and political leaders, notes Mark Chapman (2008, 3) have adopted a secular 
political discourse and been “very reticent about speaking of their faith” or “how faith has 
influenced their approach to public policy.” 
This prime-ministerial reticence was matched by a scholarly neglect of the subject 
of faith and its impact in Downing Street. With a few notable exceptions – Gladstone in 
the nineteenth, Baldwin in the twentieth century (Shannon 2007; Williamson 1999) – 
relatively little academic attention has been paid to prime ministers’ religious beliefs and 
their possible influence on or relationship to their policies or ideological goals and the 
manner in which they present and seek to justify them. The subject of religion and the US 
presidency has, in contrast, received much more attention (Smith 2006). Presidents and 
presidential candidates are expected to do what Roosevelt used to call “the God stuff” 
(O’Connell 2012, 54): that is to speak about faith and frequently use the Bible in their 
political rhetoric. Domke and Coe (2010) argue the political and rhetorical use of religion – 
what they term “the God strategy” – has become even more central and important in the 
United States from the 1980s onwards as Republican and Democrat political leaders and 
presidents speak the language of faith, invoke God and link the United States with divine 
will, and send out signals to connect to the faithful. The context for this religious politics is, 
of course, a country that in comparison with other modern Western societies, including 
Britain, scores very high on general measures of religiosity and has large and well-organised 
evangelical, fundamentalist and conservative Christian groups and communities.  
One study found that, in contrast to US presidential speeches, when it did happen, 
the use of religious rhetoric by British political leaders was “notably more subtle and 
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indirect” – with references, for instance, to “faith” rather than directly to “God”. All the 
same, the use of religious references or allusions in British party leaders’ speeches have 
increased after 2001, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, and with Tony Blair clearly leading 
the way (Theos 2008). But “doing God” or “doing faith” is, in many ways, a difficult and 
risky rhetorical strategy for prime ministers. “Politicians feel uncomfortable debating 
religion”, Tony Blair (2012, 5) has said. “It is off our beaten track of financial crises, 
security challenges, healthcare, education, welfare. It pitches us into an unfamiliar realm 
where we suspect, rightly, many nasty swamps of controversy are located.” When Blair 
talked about how his religious faith shaped his political thinking he opened himself up to 
charges of “playing politics with God” (Campbell 2007, 112) and of being a 
“sanctimonious, calculating hypocrite” (Seldon 2004, 518). “God was a disaster area”, his 
media adviser Alastair Campbell insisted, after an interview Blair gave on the subject 
triggered a media storm. “British people are not like Americans, who seem to want their 
politicians banging the Bible the whole time. They hated it . . . The ones who didn’t believe 
didn’t want to hear it; and the ones who did felt the politicians who went on about it were 
doing it for the wrong reasons” (Campbell 2007, 111-112). Similarly, there was a backlash 
when David Cameron in 2014 described Britain as “a Christian country” and went further 
than he had done before in talking about his personal religious beliefs.  “Jesus invented the 
Big Society 2,000 years ago”, Cameron said in reference to his “Big Society” initiative of 
volunteering and civic responsibility. “I just want to see more of it” (Withnal 2014).  Critics 
questioned his motives and timing: was he trying to distract attention from the damaging 
resignation of Cabinet minister Maria Miller, or “dog-whistle” to reassure disgruntled 
church-going Conservative activists antagonized over gay-marriage, or hoping to win back 
religiously-inclined UKIP voters ahead of the European elections (Theakston 2014)?  
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These reactions show how controversial and problematic invoking religion to 
explain or justify policy decisions can be in modern secular democracies, with claims it is 
potentially divisive, illegitimate and not accessible to public reason (Crabb 2009; Graham 
2009). As Blair once said, when asked why he didn’t speak about God more in public: 
“Look what happens when I do” (Spencer 2006, 14). Although quite open about how his 
faith played into his politics when he was in Opposition, he became progressively “more 
diffident” as prime minister in the face of a more sceptical public as his association with 
George W. Bush, the fallout from the Iraq war, and public anxieties about religious 
fundamentalism and extremism made his public statements about religion more 
controversial (Graham 2009, 149-151). Conscious that he was walking a tightrope, Blair’s 
public line on religious belief and politics had become by 2006 the defensive “it’s probably 
best not to take it too far” (Brown 2006). 
 It is significant that only out of office has Gordon Brown spoken out eloquently 
about the relationship between faith and politics in modern societies, regretting he did not 
as prime minister go further in drawing on and speaking about his own Christian faith.  
Brown argued prime ministers should not be asked to leave their religious beliefs at the 
door of Number 10 and in so doing bring a “diminished version” of themselves into the 
public square. But they should not thereby claim a moral superiority or immunity from the 
need for rational deliberation about politics and policy and the demands of robust 
democratic contestation (Brown 2011).  
The Study of Rhetoric in British Party Politics 
We argue that since the premiership of Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Ministers have 
increasingly started using religious language in their political rhetoric. This is used to justify 
policy, support their ideological positions, present a public persona, and underline their 
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personal ethical appeal to highlight their individual moral suitability to be a national leader. 
As Alexander (2006) observed, political leaders present themselves as “exemplifications of 
sacred religious and secular texts” (Alexander 2006, 52) to enhance their public image.  
Despite this relationship between religion and political rhetoric there is little or no 
scholarly analysis of how the role of religious arguments has affected the image of British 
Prime Ministers. As Richard Toye notes there are few “explicitly conceived rhetorical 
analyses” as a method of evaluating British politics (Toye 2011, 177). Much of the existing 
scholarship tends to be “rather narrowly focused work from within the discipline of 
linguistics” (Toye 2011, 177). Charteris-Black (2005) examines political metaphor, while 
Gaffney analyses political personas and reputations (Gaffney 1991; Gaffney and Lahel 
2013). More generally, the British study of political rhetoric examines such issues as party 
renewal or non-religious aspects of leadership style (Lawrence 2008; 2009; Lanham 1991; 
Leith 2012). None examine religious aspects of political rhetoric and Prime Ministerial 
leadership. 
There is no single methodological approach in the study of rhetorical discourses 
within British politics. This field is in its infancy, compared to the United States (Crines and 
Hayton 2014, 6). James Martin (N.d.) highlights the general importance of analyzing 
political rhetoric by arguing “rhetorical analysis underscores the situated nature of ideas, 
that is, their presence in speech and argument” (Martin N.d, 1). Given the impact of 
religious ideas, these are worthy of significant scholarly attention. Indeed, rhetorical 
analyses enable the deconstruction of religious ideas, and the “content of arguments by… 
identifying premises and conclusions” of evident political controversies (Martin N.d, 1). 
However existing scholarship focuses on the political theory of ideologies, which prevents 
this subfield of British political science from embracing religious discourses.  
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Within this subfield of political science the emergent scholarship analyses how 
rhetoric works in terms of three core characteristics of effective communication: individual 
character/credibility, use of emotions, and evidence/logic (Finlayson 2008, 2012, 2013; 
Finlayson and Martin 2008; Toye 2011, 2013; Atkins et al. 2014; Atkins 2011). These 
characteristics have been used to deconstruct British conservative neoliberalism (Crines 
N.d), the national interest of the Coalition government (Crines 2013a), and the anti-
establishment rhetorician, George Galloway (Crines 2013b). The nature and impact of 
different oratorical and rhetorical appeals is also the focus of two substantive studies of 
British Labour (Crines and Hayton 2015) and Conservative (Hayton and Crines 2015) party 
oratory. Finlayson notes “appeals to the character of the addresser may be based on 
implicit claims to authority, or perhaps sympathy, and may be attempts to encourage an 
audience to identify with the speaker or to see them as ‘just like us’” (Finlayson 2007, 558). 
In terms of religious arguments, this expects the speaker to demonstrate a similar moral 
character to the audience to gain credibility. A speaker may also make use of emotions. 
Indeed, “he or she attempts to move them by putting them in the right frame of minds, or, 
put differently, to create the right disposition” (Greiner 2005). For example the speakers 
under review ask their audience to imagine essentially normative forms of society. 
Meanwhile statistical or empirical arguments appeal to logic and evidence. Importantly 
emotional, logical, and character-based arguments are used asymmetrically by the 
rhetorician (Crines N.d), yet can be evaluated in isolation.   
This paper analyses the religious discourses of Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, 
Gordon Brown, and David Cameron. Thatcher’s premiership represented a sea-change 
moment in British political discourses that prompted her successors to follow a similar 
style of ethical conviction. The move towards the politics and rhetoric of conviction and 
individual moral belief has been accompanied by an expectation amongst the electorate for 
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moral credibility in British Prime Ministers and party leaders, particularly concerning social 
welfare (Crines N.d; Hayton and Crines 2015; Atkins N.d). This expectation had not been 
as prevalent before moral rhetoric came to “inform suspicion of any politics unregulated by 
a higher-order discourse (be it religious, moral or scientific)” (Finlayson 2012, 751). 
We are concerned with the extent to which these political leaders are using religious 
arguments to build up their broader political character as moral actors; the means and 
arguments by which their construction of truth reflects their ideological agenda; and 
whether their intended audience is the recipient or if it is expected to enhance their 
character and credibility as the speech travels. Our analysis concludes by drawing out 
similarities and differences in how each leader used religion rhetorically. We draw out 
common themes and techniques to discern the extent that political discourse and religious 
rhetoric are intertwined. 
 
Margaret Thatcher 
Margaret Thatcher’s deep and life-long religious faith was a massively important aspect of 
her personality, thinking and politics (Weiss 2011). Her Christian faith undoubtedly 
“shaped and guided her political policies and choices” (Smith 2007). Although not 
apparently interested in theological questions about spirituality or sacraments, she was 
extremely interested in the idea of duty to God, in ethics, and what she saw as “putting into 
practice the teaching of Scripture” (Moore 2013, 6; 349). She had no qualms about 
speaking publicly and strongly about her religious upbringing and beliefs (Campbell 2003, 
388), drawing on the Bible in her speeches, and not shying away from talking about good 
and evil (Thatcher 1963, 1978a, 1978b, 1981, 1988). “Although I have always resisted the 
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argument that a Christian has to be a Conservative”, she wrote in her memoirs, “I have 
never lost my conviction that there is a deep and providential harmony between the kind of 
political economy I favour and the insights of Christianity” (Thatcher 1995, 554-555). She 
clashed loudly with the bishops in the 1980s, thinking they were soggy collectivists and that 
the churches should stay out of politics, while in turn they were critical of her tone and the 
social consequences of her policies (Filby 2010).  
As Conservative Party leader and then prime minster, Thatcher set out her views 
on Christianity and politics in speeches at St Lawrence Jewry in London (Thatcher 1978a, 
1981) and to the Church of Scotland General Assembly (Thatcher 1988). Establishing an 
identity and saying that she was speaking as both a Christian and a politician whose 
religious convictions affected the way she approached politics and government was a 
credibility-enhancing claim made in these speeches, one directed both at her immediate 
audiences and at the wider public as she strove to define her character as a values-driven 
and strong leader. She declared herself “thankful” she was “brought up in a Christian 
family and learned the message of the Christian faith” (Thatcher 1981), recollecting “many 
discussions” in her early life about the Bible and religion (Thatcher 1988). Crucially, 
Christianity had equipped her with “standards to which political actions must, in the end, 
be referred” (Thatcher 1978a). “We were taught always to make up our own minds and 
never to take the easy way of following the crowd” (Thatcher 1978a). 
Emotional arguments and appeals to collective values, that strove to embed ideas 
about Britain as a Christian nation in need of “national spiritual renewal” (Smith 2007, 248-
251), run through Thatcher’s political-religious rhetoric. The moral dimension of national 
life was critical: a nation and a people “need a purpose and an ethic. The State cannot 
provide these – they can only come from the teachings of a Faith . . .” (Thatcher 1978a). 
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“Most people”, she said (Thatcher 1981), “would accept that we have a national way of 
life…founded on Biblical principles.” Historically, “we acknowledged as a nation that God 
was the source of our strength and that the teachings of Christ applied to our national as 
well as our personal life” (Thatcher 1981). “The Christian religion – which, of course, 
embodies many of the great spiritual and moral truths of Judaism – is a fundamental part 
of our national heritage. And I believe it is the wish of the overwhelming majority of 
people that this heritage should be preserved and fostered.” Furthermore, schools should 
teach the crucial part the “Judaic-Christian tradition” had played in “moulding our laws, 
manners and institutions” (Thatcher 1988).  Thatcher was always a strong admirer of the 
Jewish faith, tradition and community values, it should be noted (Thatcher 1988c; Weiss 
2011, 37-8).  But crucially, she believed Britain’s cultural identity and values as a Christian 
nation were under threat, being challenged and in danger of being undermined: 
             
These characteristics of our nation, the acknowledgement of the Almighty, a 
sense of tolerance, an acknowledgement of moral absolutes and a positive view 
of work, have sustained us in the past. Today they are being challenged… Each 
generation must renew its spiritual assets if the integrity of the nation is to 
survive (Thatcher 1981). 
 
Another key theme in Thatcher’s political-religious rhetoric related to the 
relationship between the individual, society and the moral importance of work and wealth 
creation (Smith 2008, 241-248). Here we see euphoric emotional rhetoric in concert with 
appeals to empiricism. It is a myth that she believed there was “no such thing as society”.  
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Rather she was concerned to challenge the idea that social needs were best met through the 
collectivist welfare state rather than through family, community activity and charitable 
giving: “intervention by the State must never become so great that it effectively removes 
personal responsibility” (Thatcher 1988). “To mutter ‘the government ought to be doing 
something about it’ is not the way to rekindle the spirit of the nation,” she argued 
(Thatcher 1981). “There are grave moral dangers and serious practical ones in letting 
people get away with the idea that the can delegate all their responsibilities to public 
officials and institutions”, she maintained (Thatcher 1978a).  Giving a specific example of 
care for elderly relatives, the disabled or children, she went on: “Once you give people the 
idea that all this can be done by the State, and that it is somehow second-best or even 
degrading to leave it to private people . . . then you will begin to deprive human beings of 
one of the essential ingredients of humanity – personal moral responsibility.” We should 
not, she insisted, “allow people to handover to the State all their personal responsibility.” “I 
wonder”, she asked,  “whether the State services would have done as much for the man 
who fell among thieves as the Good Samaritan did for him” (Thatcher 1978a)? 
“No one would remember the Good Samaritan if he’d only had good intentions”, 
Thatcher once famously told a television interviewer. The important point was that “he had 
money as well” (Campbell 2003, 391). Hard work, thrift, prudence, and enterprise were 
thus key virtues. “We have always had a sense that work is not only a necessity, it is a duty, 
and indeed a virtue”, she argued. “Creating wealth must be seen as a Christian obligation if 
we are to fulfil our role as stewards of the resources and talents the Creator has provided 
for us” (Thatcher 1981). “We are told [in the Bible] we must work and use our talents to 
create wealth” (Thatcher 1988). She put her own spin on the parable of the talents: “the 
steward who simply did not use the resources entrusted to him was roundly condemned. 
The two who used them to produce more wealth were congratulated and given more” 
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(Thatcher 1981). In another version, she told a party gathering: “Those who traded with 
their talents, and multiplied them, were those who won approval. And the essence of their 
performance was the willingness to take risks to make a gain” (Thatcher 1985). Addressing 
the Church of Scotland she drew on the audience’s emotions in referring to how the Tenth 
Commandment (“Thou shalt not covet”) “recognises that making money and owning 
things could become selfish activities. But it is not the creation of wealth that is wrong but 
love of money for its own sake . . . How could we respond to the many calls for help, or 
invest for the future, or support the wonderful artists and craftsmen whose work also 
glorifies God, unless we had first worked hard and used our talents to create the necessary 
wealth?” (Thatcher 1988). 
Underpinning all this was the view that individual choice and personal 
responsibility was the basis of Christianity and morality. The “defence of the individual 
against the state” was in her eyes “founded on a Christian concept of man”: an individual 
choosing between good and evil (Thatcher 1978b). This implied the Conservatives’ 
individualist approach was morally superior and “closer to the Christian ideal” (Filby 2010, 
190) than collectivist socialism. The “idea of personal moral responsibility” was at the heart 
of the Biblical message. Here she combines her character and credibility with emotions to 
argue “It is to individuals that the Ten Commandments are addressed . . . the “thou” to 
whom these resounding imperatives are addressed is you and me” (Thatcher 1981). The 
admonition to “love thy neighbour as thyself, and do as you would be done by”, she 
explained “does not denigrate self, or elevate love of others above it. On the contrary, it 
sees concern for self and responsibility for self as something to be expected” This led, she 
said, to “the great truth” that “self-regard is the root of regard for one’s fellows” (Thatcher 
1977). And in turn this individualist view of morality led to the view the state should not 
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provide more than a safety net. “Generosity is born in the hearts of men and women; it 
cannot be manufactured by politicians . . . [or] left to officials” (Thatcher 1981).  
 
Tony Blair 
As a student at Oxford University Tony Blair “was initially quite articulate and open in 
discussing how his faith informed his politics” (Graham 2009, 149). This was a luxury he 
could less afford as he “trod a fine line between the UK electorate’s admiration of him as a 
creature of principle and a religious fanatic” (Graham 2009, 149). Indeed, as Blair noted 
religious beliefs risked “people think[ing] you’re a nutter” (BBC 2007). Yet in his formative 
years he strove to promote the relationship between Christianity and democratic socialism 
through such groups as the “Christian Socialist Movement” (Graham 2009, 150) and 
through contributing to such publications as Reclaiming the Ground: Christianity and Socialism 
(Bryant 1993). Blair was not afraid of publically showing his Christian faith before 1997, 
however as Prime Minister he was less able to “do God”. The Northern Ireland peace 
process, the relationship with George W. Bush, and the subsequent War on Terror were 
each arenas that required a delicate rhetorical balancing act to avoid the perception of 
religious favouritism. This balancing act did not prevent him from acting in a value-driven 
manner, however.  
Throughout his time as Prime Minister, Blair strove to communicate a flavour of 
his religious values by emphasising common strands of social obligation he claimed held 
universality. Blair used his credibility as a social democratic Christian, however his 
“missionary zeal” often made him “appear judgemental and uncompromising” (Burton and 
McCabe 2009, 102) to those who held different values. Yet for Blair, the universality of 
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moral values straddled different denominations, secularists, and agnostics, making faith a 
positive social force (Griffiths 2011, 14). Indeed, during the 2010 Munk Debate with 
Christopher Hitchens, Blair argued “you do not need to be a person of faith in order to do 
good work” (Griffiths 2011, 18). The rationale for this strategy was to present a unifying 
purpose that drew attention to common goods amongst those of different beliefs and 
none. This strategy demonstrated his moral character that, he hoped, would appeal to a 
broader audience as the message travelled beyond the immediate arena. 
Blair provides a useful summation of the relationship between religion and politics: 
“If you are a person of faith it’s part of your character, it defines you in many ways as a 
human being. It doesn’t provide the policy answers” (Griffiths 2011, 35). Religious values, 
for Blair, are perspectives of how social solidarity is advanced. He used emotions by 
arguing “We now know, through several quite different disciplines, that they are universal 
values. Economists call them ‘social capital’. Evolutionary biologists call them ‘reciprocal 
altruism’. Political theorists call them communitarianism or civil society. Each of these 
phrases stands for what is really a quite simple idea that what gives us the power to survive 
in a rapidly changing environment are the habits of co-operation” (Blair 2000). Thus, 
values may be articulated differently by different groups despite similar moral aspirations of 
individual and collective goods. 
He later went on to argue politics and religion are interconnected because of 
mutual dependency. “Politics without values is sheer pragmatism”, Blair insisted. “Values 
without politics can be ineffective. The two must go together” (Blair 2001). This 
interconnected relationship was a central element of Blair’s religious credibility because in 
isolation neither could prove effective in improving society. Indeed “faith in politics isn’t 
only about the relationship between faith and politics. It is also about having faith in the 
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political process itself and its capacity to achieve a better society” (Blair 2001). Blair argued 
the values of both can engineer social improvements domestically and internationally, 
demonstrating the benefits of a close relationship between politics and religion. 
He also argued religion was not in decline. To articulate its social relevance, he 
argued “I know that people talk a great deal about the decline of religion and the churches 
in our national life. But…it is your revival and adaptation which are striking” (Blair 2005). 
Here his character is used to highlight the value of community faith groups by affirming 
their endurance. “I would like to see you play a bigger not a lesser role in the future”, he 
declared (Blair 2005). To justify this proposition he argued social justice and religious 
values work in unison. “People often ask what is the essential idea that binds together our 
policy on the NHS, schools, welfare and the economy. I say it is to recast the 1945 
settlement on public services and welfare state for the modern age. To remain absolutely 
true to the principles of social justice and opportunity for all. The voluntary sector, 
including the churches and faith communities, have a critical role to play in meeting 
community and individual needs in this new settlement” (Blair 2005). Blair’s recasting of 
the pillars of social justice with faith groups aims to demonstrate how their interconnected 
nature benefits society. To do so he highlights how religion has historically embraced 
changing ideas in society and the campaigning role of churches: “I think of the campaign to 
abolish the slave trade, led by William Wilberforce with so many Christian organizations in 
support” (Blair 2005). By drawing attention to the role of religions in the successful 
abolition of slavery Blair underlines their progressive character as a force for contemporary 
social good. To ensure this argument resonates, Blair continues by emphasising their 
enduring values and relevance. He paid “tribute to the wide array of Christian and faith-
based charities which work across the developing world” (Blair 2005). This rhetorical 
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strategy enables Blair to show how faith has driven social change domestically and is 
continuing to do so internationally, enhancing the credibility of his argument. 
Blair also highlighted the importance of religious faith as a social motivator for 
those directly involved. “You do this because of your faith, not in isolation from it, a point 
that government - central and local - must always appreciate” (Blair 2005). For Blair, the 
power of religious values as a social motivator is highly effective in constructing his 
argument that politics and religion are natural bedfellows. He also sought to highlight the 
interconnected values of those who held distinct theological differences. This was 
particularly an issue when arguing against religious extremism. He drew out the importance 
of moderation and how those of different faiths must unite to combat radicals from within 
their own theological tradition(s). “Around the world today, along with the images of 
violence, are the patient good works of people of different faiths coming together” (Blair 
2007). For Blair, this sense of unity in opposition to radicalism enables their shared values 
to intermix in the promotion of peaceful cooperation. He continues by arguing faith “is a 
crucial motivator of millions of citizens around the world, and is an essential non-
governmental way of helping to make society work. To lose that contribution would not 
just be a pity; it would be a huge backward step” (Blair 2007).  
Gordon Brown 
Gordon Brown’s political persona was textured by his background and upbringing. 
Brown’s father, a Minister in the Church of Scotland, was a major influence on his 
childhood moral values. For a speech to the 2006 Labour conference, Brown argued that 
his upbringing instilled compassion, honesty, and hard work as his moral compass, and that 
“we should use whatever talent we had to help people least able to help themselves” 
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(Brown 2006). Add to this the “death of two beloved parents, marriage, fatherhood and the 
tragic loss of a child” within a short timeframe, and Brown found a new “willingness to 
advertise his religious background” (Gay 2009, 72). This went well “with the established 
grain of New Labour’s strategy for renewal” (Gay 2009, 72), affording him the opportunity 
to advance his morality-driven interpretation of social democracy. In 2006 Brown – then 
widely seen as prime-minister-in-waiting - publicly endorsed a book by the prominent 
American pastor Jim Wallis (God’s Politics) which criticised the religious right and called for 
a progressive faith-based politics of the centre-left, stressing personal responsibility and the 
need to work for economic justice at home and in the developing world – causes close to 
Brown’s heart (Bartley 2006). Wallis became a close friend of Brown’s and described the 
politician as having the church “hardwired” into him: “I think it’s in his DNA, Christian 
thinking . . . It really is very powerful in him.” Brown told Wallis that he needed and used 
the moral pressure of church groups to help push forward on his favourite causes such as 
poverty and aid for Africa (Hinsliff 2006).  However, while in office as prime minister 
(2007-2010), Brown shied away from speaking directly about his personal Christian faith 
and convictions: fearful of a media backlash he instead talked more generally about moral 
values, the inspiration he got from his father’s work as a minister, and the importance of 
faith communities in building social capital (Gay 2007; Chapman 2008; Brown 2011). 
When addressing a faith group conference in 2008 Brown emotionally commended 
their work: “whenever you see suffering you want to heal it, whenever you see injustice you 
want to rectify” (Brown 2008a). From this he argued that faith represented an interlinking 
force of similar moral values that bind together those who held different theological beliefs. 
Like Blair, he noted the credibility of faith groups derived from their historical importance 
to social change. “From the timeless wisdom of all the great religions - from which billions 
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across the world derive daily inspiration - there is a consistent ethical core that propels us 
to act:” (Brown 2008b). A sense of shared moral purpose underscored the value of faith 
for social justice. Indeed, “has that not been the message of the churches and faith groups 
throughout the ages? I would say to you to have confidence today, have confidence today 
that just as Mandela went free and apartheid came to an end, that while the arc of the 
moral universe is long, it does bend towards justice” (Brown 2008b). Rhetorically speaking, 
Brown is emphasising their importance in promoting personal morality and social progress, 
demonstrating their value to society.  Noting that “more than two-thirds of our fellow 
citizens are followers of the major faiths” (Brown 2008c), he drew attention to the 
numerical strength of global religion and, by implication, its significance. He emotionally 
argued “we can be in no doubt about the power of faith to shape our world” (Brown 
2008c). This allusion to the role of religion in forging cultural and social traditions 
confirms, for Brown, the sociological value of faith.  
He also argued a fusion of religion and society produces a stronger sense of 
nationhood. “While it is not for politicians to lead that bringing together of faith - that can 
ultimately only be done by the leaders of faith communities themselves - we cannot 
successfully lead nations without it” (Brown 2008c). For Brown, the individual moral 
values of the citizenry constructs a sense of national identity that promotes togetherness 
(Brown 2008c). For Brown, individuals are linked together collectively through faith and 
social values. “Through each of our heritages, our traditions and faiths, runs a single 
powerful moral sense. A sense that we all share the pain of others. A sense that we believe 
in something bigger than ourselves” (Brown 2008c). Brown defines faith as an 
interconnecting sense of purpose that sees the value of religion as a moral obligation to 
improve the social position of others. “Most of us accept that what you do not wish done 
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to yourself you do not do to others. It is the same sacred ideal at the ethical heart of all true 
religions: our duty to others” (Brown 2008c). Indeed, even though denominations derive 
from different theological traditions, Brown rhetorically combines them to construct a 
single moral social objective. This sense of togetherness is, he argues vital for the 
community. “I believe that through our continuing dialogue, we can come to recognise our 
common ground. The common ground on which we stand, whatever our faith positions. A 
common commitment to peace, to freedom, to prosperity, to tolerance and respect” 
(Brown 2008c).  
Brown’s justifications for the role of faith and religion in society were partly 
predicated upon “why it seems so uncontroversial, so incontestable, even natural, for 
members of churches and faith groups as individuals, and indeed for churches and faith 
groups as institutions, to involve themselves in a great moral movement for political 
change” (Brown 2011). However, his defence of religion in active society is challenged by 
what he defined as liberal secularism. This issue proved problematic for Brown’s argument 
because liberal secularism acts as an intellectually exclusive entity that precluded religion 
from political discourses. He argued “the conventional orthodoxy today is of a public 
square, an arena for making political decisions, where religious belief is, at best, at arms-
length and which, with some notable exceptions, has become the embodiment of what 
some people call liberal secularism” (Brown 2011). For Brown the dominance of 
secularism in the political process has prevented religious values from penetrating into the 
social agenda and political discourse. This, in turn, has held back domestic and 
international politics from addressing economic and social problems that Brown argues can 
be successfully combatted by using faith groups. He continues, however by defending the 
rejection of religious and secular theology in politics. “It is right to reject a theocratic 
20 
 
approach to politics” however “we should also reject the standard version of liberal 
secularism - and for exactly the same reason. Because, just as theocracy undermines 
freedom of conscience, so too does liberal secularism, because it unfairly expects people of 
faith to leave their conscience at the entrance to the public square” (Brown 2011). Brown’s 
argument is that both theocracy and liberal secularism reduce the ability of political actors 
to govern from a sense of moral purpose. To remedy the problem, Brown argues “this 
country is ready for . . . a deliberative and democratic politics” (Brown 2011) in which both 
secularists and religious groups engage in closer value-driven discourses. Indeed, “we will 
not achieve it - and it will not be widely understood - unless we answer the charges laid by 
both the theocrats and the secularists. I believe we can do that best by advancing a 
framework for faith politics that gives priority to values but contains the duty to seek 
common ground” (Brown 2011). It must be remembered, however, that Brown’s advocacy 
for a fusion of faith and politics strives to rhetorically justify their real-world value. He 
concludes by arguing “we can elevate religious values to the heart of the debate about 
global development and our global society” (Brown 2011). Those values, Brown argues, 
revolve around solidarity, togetherness and cooperation, which are essential elements of 
social justice. However, he cautions that political discourses cannot “continue to consign 
religious values to only the fringes of the debate about the future of our national 
economies and societies” (Brown 2011). The rationale for this conclusion is predicated 
around his belief that “my religion and reason tell me that we cannot for long be truly 





David Cameron describes himself as a classic “racked with doubt” Anglican (Elliott and 
Hanning 2012, 239). At face value this suggests a private role for the established Church in 
his life with little active involvement in his political ideology. However, when asked what 
he believed the role of the Church was, Cameron replied “we need to make sure that the 
balance between Church and state, faith and politics, religious identity and political identity 
that has developed over centuries is maintained” (Jones 2008, 171). Cameron’s subsequent 
prime-ministerial rhetoric promotes this fusion by arguing for a sense of moral patriotism 
that is premised on romanticism, national symbols and traditions. Cameron’s religious 
values texture his political rhetoric in a far deeper form than might initially be assumed. 
This differs from how Blair and Brown saw religion because Cameron uses the values of 
faith to promote individual responsibility.  
For Cameron the value of religion is as a key component for constructing moral 
citizenship. Rhetorically he defines this as an individual undertaking that distinguishes 
society from the state. This is particularly noteworthy when advancing justifications for 
faith groups and philanthropy as key components of the “Big Society”. While Blair and 
Brown sought to institutionalise moral collectivism, unsurprisingly Cameron joins with 
Thatcher by arguing the value of faith as moral individualism.  
For him the moral individual is one who takes care of those in need and has 
traditional values rooted in a romanticised view of British history and identity. To advance 
this proposition he argues “when you think of our country, think of it as one that not only 
cherishes faith, but one that is deeply, but quietly, compassionate” (Cameron 2010). 
Cameron uses emotional arguments to highlight the importance of faith in texturing a 
fusion of moral identity with compassion. Rhetorically, he also uses his own experiences to 
demonstrate the interconnected aspirations of religion and politics by arguing “in my own 
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life I have seen it in the many, many kind messages that I have had as I have cradled a new 
daughter and said goodbye to a wonderful father” (Cameron 2010).  
For Cameron Christianity also plays a great role in defining cultural and national 
identity. This extends not only to the institutions of state but also to British culture, social 
welfare and the English language. Cameron highlights their significance by arguing “just as 
our language and culture is steeped in the Bible, so too is our politics. From human rights 
and equality to our constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy; from the role of 
the church in the first forms of welfare provision, to the many modern day faith-led social 
action projects – the Bible has been a spur to action for people of faith throughout history, 
and it remains so today” (Cameron 2011a). The importance of Cameron’s style of religious 
defence fuses the various strands of British nationhood with the historical impact of 
Christianity on the evolution of national and political traditions. This also aims to create a 
greater sense of interconnectedness that equates the political and cultural significance of 
faith with civil and social reforms across Britain.  
Moreover, as with Brown and Blair, he avoids the theological fundamentals of 
religious belief. Indeed, he argues that his Christianity is “constantly grappling with the 
difficult questions when it comes to some of the big theological issues” (Cameron 2011a). 
He has, however, said “I believe we should be more confident about our status as a 
Christian country, more ambitious about expanding the role of faith-based organisations, 
and, frankly, more evangelical about a faith that compels us to get out there and make a 
difference to people's lives” (Cameron 2014). Like Brown, Cameron’s argument strives to 
use religion to promote its value in improving society. However his reaffirmation of 
Britain’s Christian heritage is an attempt to confirm the historic fusion of protestant values 
in contemporary society. He qualifies this by arguing “Let me be clear: I am not in any way 
saying that to have another faith – or no faith – is somehow wrong.” (Cameron 2011a). By 
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striving to embrace those of other faiths and none he is following in Brown and Blair’s 
rhetorical footsteps.  “I am also incredibly proud that Britain is home to many different 
faith communities, who do so much to make our country stronger” (Cameron 2011a). 
Rhetorically this is an attempt to enhance the credibility of his argument vis-à-vis the impact 
of Christianity upon British identity. Thus to ensure this message resonates he reaffirms the 
key point emotionally, saying “the Bible has helped to give Britain a set of values and 
morals which make Britain what it is today. Values and morals we should actively stand up 
and defend” (Cameron 2011a). Thus for Cameron the importance of religion is in creating 
a sense of moral identity through faith, regardless of its theological heritage. Moreover, his 
defence also revolves around the strengthening effect of religion upon societies. “Societies 
do not necessarily become more secular with modernity but rather more plural” (Cameron 
2011a). Also the moral values that Cameron defends are manifest through individual 
perspectives on how the moral citizen engages with society. Those are “responsibility, hard 
work, charity, compassion, humility, self-sacrifice, love pride in working for the common 
good and honouring the social obligations we have to one another, to our families and our 
communities” (Cameron 2011a). These Christian values are used by Cameron to discern 
how faith should manifest itself in society. Indeed, by interconnecting religious values with 
a sense of moral, patriotic citizenship he is also implicitly presenting the inverse as a 
rhetorical “other”. For example “for people who do have a faith, their faith can be a 
helpful prod in the right direction. And whether inspired by faith or not – that direction, 
that moral code, matters” (Cameron 2011a). Thus Cameron uses emotional arguments, in 
concert with his character as a faithful individual, to demonstrate the value of fusing moral 
individualism with society. He concludes by arguing “I have never really understood the 
argument some people make about the church not getting involved in politics. To me, 
Christianity, faith, religion, the Church and the Bible are all inherently involved in politics 
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because so many political questions are moral questions. So I don’t think we should be shy 
or frightened of this” (Cameron 2011a). 
 
Conclusion 
For all the long-term decline in religious faith, identification, practice and culture in Britain 
(Brown 2001), it is still the case that a majority - 59.3 per cent - of the population described 
themselves as Christian in the 2011 census (down from 71.7 per cent in 2001), while 25.1 
per cent described themselves has having no religion (up from 14.8 per cent in 2001) 
(Kettell N.d, 8). Regular church attendance has declined significantly over time but the 
2012 figures of 1.05 million taking part in a Church of England service each week and 0.9 
million attending mass each week in a Catholic church are still five times the combined 
current membership (368,000) of the three main political parties (Labour, Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat). “Little wonder, then, that party leaders pay lip service – perhaps 
cynically – to this sleeping giant”, comments Andrew Hawkins (2012): “Britain’s 
churchgoers are a constituency that cannot be ignored”. Moreover although the influence 
of religion on electoral behaviour is less than other factors (such as current issues, the state 
of the economy, perceptions of leadership and the socio-economic background of voters), 
there is still a discernible influence, including a link between being Anglican and voting 
Conservative for instance (Clements and Spence 2014), and survey research shows that 
more than half (56 per cent) of Conservative voters in 2010 considered themselves to be 
religious, compared to 43 per cent of those who voted Labour (Kettell N.d.). In this 
context prime-ministerial religious rhetoric still has the potential to yield political benefits. 
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 As political leaders, prime ministers are aware of the need to tailor their language 
in response to changing contexts. Blair found himself up against a more sceptical public as 
his career went on while Brown’s “moral compass” rhetoric was partly about positioning 
himself as “not Blair”. Cameron’s appeal to religious voters could in part be interpreted as 
an attempt to reassure traditional Conservatives and compensate for their negative views of 
his progressive policies (such as same-sex-marriage). Thatcher’s strongly-articulated 
“singling out of Judeo-Christian virtues” in the 1980s would not have been possible in “the 
more inclusively multi-faith Britain” of the early twenty-first century (Grimley 2012, 92-93) 
in which Cameron appeals more in terms of a “warm and fuzzy Anglicanism” (The 
Economist 2014).  
The idea that recent British Prime Ministers “don’t do God” is wrong. Prime 
Ministers Thatcher, Blair, Brown and Cameron have indeed directly and indirectly “done 
God” in their political rhetoric to construct their persona, pursue specific political 
objectives, and promote a role for religion in British politics. Each used religious-based 
arguments to justify political objectives. For Thatcher and Cameron their justifications are 
used to reinforce economic individualism alongside a constructed and romanticised view of 
British history and identity. Indeed, both drew upon the Bible for such justifications. In 
contrast, Blair and Brown used religion to argue for greater economic and social 
cooperation alongside highlighting the value of faith groups. Neither Blair nor Brown 
directly used the Bible in the same manner as their Conservative opponents; however they 
strived to draw attention to the comparable values of different faiths by creating a sense of 
unity and social democratic purpose.  
However, what unites each of the leaders under discussion are their rhetorical 
strategies. Each relies upon their character and credibility to justify a closer relationship 
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between politics and religion. Such claims enable the speaker to demonstrate they reflect 
the values of their immediate audience, thereby ensuring a positive reception. Moreover, 
each use emotions to texture their arguments with a sense of moral injustice on the part of 
those who seemingly exclude faith groups, appeals again calculated to influence the 
reactions of their respective audiences to embrace their argument. But as the speech travels 
beyond the immediate audience the speaker expects it to implicitly highlight with the 
electorate their moral persona as a politician with values and one who “values values” 
(Graham 2009, 163), thereby garnering enhanced credibility for their broader objectives. As 
Prime Minister it demonstrates their trustworthy character, even with those who do not 
hold similar (or perhaps any) religious convictions. Maddox’s (2004) argument about 
Australian prime minister John Howard, can thus be placed into the British context, 
pointing to “the appeal to a highly secular electorate of an apparently sincerely – but not 
too in-your-face - religiously committed Prime Minister . . . Religious values, even if we 
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